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MODEL OF SHIP MANAGEMENT IN EMERGENCIES
ABSTRACT
The paper investigates conditions and circumstances 
of the occurrence of emergencies during ship exploitation. 
The concept and different forms of emergencies are defined 
while conditions of their occurrence are simulated, as well 
as possible modes of prevention of their occurrence or de-
velopment. On the basis of the results of the investigation 
covering 240 professional seamen an appropriate organi-
sational algorithm of participative ship management is de-
fined as foundation for the application of the management 
algorithm in emergencies. On this basis the method of Risk 
and Hazard Assessment is applied. Also, the algorithm of 
Decision Making Process is derived from the related investi-
gations. The proposed algorithm is not based only on the or-
ganisational presuppositions of participative management 
but also on complex human relationships as well as acting 
in stressful circumstances through all the phases of emer-
gencies. The appropriate decision support system to help 
decision-makers during the emergencies is described.
KEY WORDS
emergencies, algorithm, team work, participative manage-
ment, hierarchical acting, scenario, communication
1. INTRODUCTION
Generally, emergency management rests on three 
pillars: knowledge about past emergencies, an un-
derstanding of human nature expressed in the so-
cial sciences, and specialized expertise in response 
mechanisms [1]. In this sense, ship management in 
emergencies is mostly based on previously trained 
and organized crew. In emergencies a combination 
of knowledge, skills and training of crewmembers as 
well as the organisation of management are fully ex-
pressed. For some types of emergencies we can be 
prepared in advance, such as, for example, the urgen-
cy in case of fire, man overboard and abandon ship 
because for these circumstances there are previously 
prescribed operational procedures and regular drills. 
Standard operational procedures for such emergen-
cies, besides training, make an appropriate reaction 
possible. Taking into consideration the preparedness 
we can quickly respond to emergencies of this kind. 
On the contrary, there are emergencies for which there 
is no previously prepared plan, in other terms, emer-
gencies for which the crew has not been trained as for 
the kinds mentioned above. Such emergencies occur 
with an explosion or a collision. In the same category 
there are also the emergencies which cannot be fore-
seen and which result from a breakdown of a piece of 
equipment or automation system. These are the cases 
of a high degree of urgency to which it is very difficult 
to respond with a reasoned, appropriate and quick re-
action. These are precisely the emergencies for which 
the crew had not been previously prepared and which 
cannot be foreseen, that demand specific knowledge 
from the standpoint of management. Such knowledge 
is necessary to make reactions even in these circum-
stances reasoned, appropriate and quick as much as 
possible.
The paper investigates various influential elements 
in the occurrence of emergencies through a scenario 
which is based on maritime accidents that actually 
happened. On the basis of the previous investigation 
[2], an appropriate organisational model of manage-
ment of the ship herself and the emergencies is de-
fined as a contribution to the safety of navigation in 
all conditions. Based on the proposed model different 
algorithms in the field of emergency management on-
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board can be tested. In addition, it is possible to build 
advanced decision support systems for management 
in emergencies. These are now “mature technologies” 
that enable better decision making [3, 4].
Emergency management consists of two phases: 
Pre-incident and Post-incident phases. Pre-incident 
tasks include predicting and analyzing of potential 
dangers and developing necessary action plans for 
mitigation. Post-incident response starts while the 
emergency is still in progress. At this stage the chal-
lenge is locating, allocating, coordinating, and man-
aging available resources. An effective emergency 
response plan should integrate both of these phases 
within its objective. Separating the Pre-incident and 
Post- incident objectives may lead to suboptimal solu-
tions to the overall problem [4].
In Section 2 general principle of participative man-
agement of ship organisation is described. The meth-
od of “short-term strategy” consisting of five elements 
is also presented.
The emergency conditions on board are defined by 
the occurrence of a serious event which can result, or 
has already resulted, in an accident involving a threat 
to human lives, ship or cargo as well as the environ-
ment. The recognition of these emergencies is pre-
sented in Section 3.
The investigation based on the proposed scenar-
io was carried out at the Faculty of Maritime Studies 
of the University of Split using navigation subsystem 
simulator North Control – class A1. The results are pre-
sented in Section 4.
In order to unify effectively the potential knowledge 
and the experience during short-term strategy it is nec-
essary to previously develop cooperation as an effec-
tive work style which should replace competition and 
individual efforts in reaching the goal. The proposed 
model of management in emergency in conditions of 
participative management is described in Section 5. 
Gathering information, assessment and the aim of 
planning, decision making, issuing orders and check-
ing the implementation are specifically described.
In Section 6 conclusions are given with some rec-
ommendations for the shipping companies.
2. MANAGEMENT OF TEAM 
WORK ORGANISATION
The team work of a modern ship organisation 
presupposes logical and natural relation and unifica-
tion of the master and deck officers as well as that of 
chief engineer and his engineer officers on the basis 
of work coordination and collaboration aiming at opti-
mum ship management in all conditions - participative 
leadership (Figure 1).
In team work operational procedures in emergen-
cies imply measures and activities which are synchro-
nised and optimised by cooperation and coordination 
[6]. The objective of such measures and activities is 
re-establishing normal circumstances in as short a pe-
riod as possible by optimum use of means, equipment 
and human resources [7]
From the organisational aspect the operational 
procedures are optimised by application of certain 
methods which enable individual crewmembers to act 
effectively. If we take into consideration the measures 
and procedures which are in advance suitable for pre-
vention of certain emergencies and are described in 
SOP (Standard Operational Procedures – SOP or check 
lists) the team acts on the basis of preparations and 
drills carried out in advance. However, in case of emer-
gencies for which there is no in-advance determined 
operational procedure, a method characteristic for 
team work itself is applied. It is the method of “short-
term strategy” consisting of five elements: 1. Define 
the nature of the problem, 2. Build up a plan of prob-
lem solving; 3. Check the plan; 4. Check if the plan is 
intelligible; 5. Control the operation and coordinate [8].
The first point or definition of the nature of the 
problem implies a mutual approach to establishing 
relevant facts which accurately describe the state and 
cause of the new situation. In this phase all the prin-
ciples of coordination and cooperation of a mature 
team are applied which means maximum activity of all 
human resources.
The second point refers to establishing acceptable 
limits of the development through an appropriate plan 
which is built up on the basis of participation of all 
crewmembers who are relevant according to their re-
sponsibilities and the nature of the emergencies. This 
second point implies high motivation, i.e. a personal 
contribution to a positive development of the situation 
within which brainstorming takes place which means 
that of all ideas and suggestions those considered 
best are selected from the aspect of eliminating emer-
gencies, i.e. returning to normal conditions. Setting 
priorities and selecting optimum is in the domain of 
the function and responsibility of the master, or team 
leader.
The third point implies checking the developed 
plan through application of the method of “questions 
and answers” in which each present team member 
makes it possible to ask questions, express reason-
able doubt and propose possible alternatives. This is 
Master
2 Eng.ndChief Eng.1 Officierst2 Officiernd3 Officierrd 3 Eng.rd
Figure 1 - Principle of participative management
of ship organisation
Source: [2] – according to [5]
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in fact the phase of checking possible effectiveness of 
action and limits set up by the plan.
The fourth point is directed towards checking the 
extent to which the plan accepted has been under-
stood by individual team members. In this phase the 
“closed loop” of plan intelligibility is to be achieved, 
i.e. a clear cause-consequence acting of individuals 
who will cooperate in action and mutually coordinate 
their activities. This point also includes the concept of 
control of acting of individual groups that will be inter-
related and dependant in their work.
The fifth point refers to managing the entire plan 
through prompt informing the master on the imple-
mentation of the plan defined, master’s responses to 
possible questions during the realisation of the plan 
as well as correction of the plan and creation of al-
ternative solutions which can become necessary while 
carrying out the activities planned. The role of the 
master or team leader in the fifth phase is important 
as an integrative element of the realisation of the plan 
defined and becomes apparent in his capability to di-
rect support and possible corrections.
3. RECOGNITION OF EMERGENCIES
Emergency conditions on board are defined by the 
occurrence of a serious event which can result, or has 
already resulted, in an accident involving a threat to 
human lives, ship or cargo as well as the environment.
Therefore, the occurrence of emergencies can be 
analysed in two ways. Namely, from the context of the 
definition of emergency on board results; these emer-
gency conditions occur when a serious event has hap-
pened which “can lead, or has already led to an ac-
cident involving a threat to human lives, environment, 
ship, or cargo”. Double-natured analysis of emergen-
cies results from the imperative of acting urgently with 
the objective to remove the consequences of the seri-
ous event by the action undertaken in order to avoid 
the accident; the action is undertaken even if the ac-
cident has already happened as a result of the serious 
event in order to diminish harmful consequences.
Identification of emergency conditions depends on 
the time passed from the occurrence of the serious 
event to its recognition as well as the effects of the 
event which is the basic element of the qualification of 
a serious event as an emergency in the narrower sense 
and emergency in the broader sense of the term.
Therefore, it can be said that immediate conditions 
and circumstances of navigation are significant factors 
of a possible occurrence of serious event. Recognised 
conditions for the occurrence of a serious event point 
out to possible latent causes which should be foreseen 
as far as possible and appropriate safety precautions 
should be undertaken. The occurrence of emergen-
cies through conditions and circumstances of naviga-
tion as well as crew readiness for possible events in-
cluding the condition of the ship herself and her cargo 
can be analysed from several aspects [2], i.e.:
a) Circumstances and conditions of navigation, con-
ditions of the crew, ship and cargo (passengers) 
are recognised in time as a possibility of the occur-
rence of a serious event which could lead to emer-
gencies, so that raising the level of precautions and 
appropriate operating procedures the occurrence 
of the event or emergency can be avoided, and 
possible accident prevented – safeguards against 
emergencies.
b) Circumstances and conditions of navigation includ-
ing conditions of the crew, ship and cargo (pas-
sengers) are not recognised in time as a possible 
cause of the occurrence of a serious event so that 
precautionary measures have not been undertak-
en; consequently the serious event has occurred 
and has led to the emergency so that at this stage 
urgent and organised measures are undertaken as 
well as operational procedures aiming at:
b1) preventing further development of the event 
that occurred and its harmful effect on people, 
ship, environment and cargo, i.e. preventing the 
possibility that such an event or situation leads 
to even more harmful consequences - emergen-
cy in the narrower sense.
c) In case the previously mentioned measures have 
not been effective, and the event which has led 
to the occurrence of an emergency has become a 
threat to the persons on board or the ship’s sea-
worthiness, i.e. has resulted in the need of aban-
doning ship, urgent and organised measures are 
undertaken:
c1) abandoning ship and saving human lives as 
well as reducing the consequences of the ac-
cident – emergency in the broader sense.
4. INVESTIGATION OF OCCURRENCE AND 
PREVENTION OF EMERGENCIES
The investigation is based on the set of scenarios 
founded on the analysis of causes of maritime acci-
dents. It simulates conditions which initially can lead 
to emergencies providing at the same time possibili-
ties to avoid dangerous circumstances and emergen-
cies. The set of scenarios [9] consists of five plus two 
independent scenarios (6, 7) which initiate action by 
the ship’s crew which can either lead to an emergency 
or prevent it depending on the procedure chosen [2]. 
These scenarios are the following:
1)  The master or officer of the watch initiates a pos-
sible action in relation to a certain situation. For 
example, the master or officer of the watch who 
is present in the navigating bridge speaks to the 
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other person on watch saying “What do you think 
will happen? What must we do?”
2)  Another person on watch comes forward and cross-
es the borders of horizontal or vertical hierarchy, 
and directs the attention of the officer of the watch 
or the master to a possible circumstance or infor-
mation.
3)  The fear of a possible accident becomes stronger 
than the fear of the master’s authority and possible 
repression, so someone comes forward from a typi-
cal hierarchical organisation structure.
4)  Relationship based on equality between the mas-
ter and the officer of the watch represents the ba-
sis of possible acting and change in the situation.
5)  Among crewmembers on watch there are estab-
lished relationships and it is exactly on the basis 
of these previously established relationships that 
prerequisites for acting and changes in the new 
situation are possible.
6)  The crewmembers on watch do not take any initia-
tive with regard to the dangerous situation since 
the master has taken over the ship management, 
so he is expected to provide further instructions 
and orders.
7)  Fear of the master’s authority (sometimes unfound-
ed requirements of the company realised through 
the master’s authority) and possible repressions 
due to not carrying out the previously given orders 
is stronger than the fear of an accident which can 
occur due to the requirements set and the orders, 
so the officer on watch without asking for assis-
tance independently tries to find a solution for the 
new situation which has occurred under way or has 
resulted from the master’s previous instructions.
The above mentioned scenarios can be put into 
function of the case recorded in the Danish Maritime 
Institute (DMI). A case which occurred during work on 
the simulator is described in [10].
In the simulated version of navigation the master 
has taken over ship management and set the ship 
onto the course which very soon should have resulted 
in grounding. All of his officers in the navigating bridge 
(who usually serve with the master) were aware of the 
fact, but nobody said or did anything. After the master 
was told to leave the bridge (simulator) on the excuse 
that he was not feeling well, all the officers took initia-
tive to prevent the accident. Analysing the above men-
tioned event from the aspect of effectiveness of de-
cision-making and their implementation the following 
conclusions can be made: Nobody opposed the mas-
ter’s decision. It was not taken into consideration that 
the person with the highest authority can be wrong 
[11]. Scenarios 6 and 7 of the set can be applied to 
this situation which negates the effectiveness of the 
organisation from the aspect of reaching the goal, i.e. 
a safe conclusion of the maritime venture.
A similar investigation was carried out with 240 
testees at the Faculty of Maritime Studies of the Uni-
versity of Split using navigation subsystem simulator 
North Control – class A1. The scenario of the investiga-
tion consisted in the master’s decision to set the ship 
on a shorter, but meteorologically unfavourable course 
with the risk of entering an area of heavy seas which 
could be a threat to a ship of the size. The investigation 
was carried out in groups consisting of three seamen 
each of whom used the above mentioned simulator 
to carry out their officer duties within the limits of the 
scenario. The investigations were organised in parallel 
with the programme of training for professional sea-
men “Bridge Resource Management” (SAS) and “Ship 
Simulator and Bridge Team Work”. The results of the 
investigation (Figure 2) indicate that out of 240 testees 
in simulated conditions, 67 testees resigned to the de-
cision of the master who was instructed to deliberately 
make wrong decisions and order their implementation 
- possibility “c1” (emergency in the broader sense). 
Even 98 testees opposed the master’s decision in the 
early phase of danger – possibility “a” (measures of 
protection against emergency), while 75 testees decid-
ed the same in the already dangerous situation – pos-
sibility “b1” (emergency in the narrower sense). The 
majority of the above mentioned 75, or 67 testees had 
their navigating experience mainly as second and third 
officers. The rest of 98 testees had their navigating ex-
perience as first officers. The basis for the reaction of 
67 testees can be brought down to Scenarios 6 and 
7 and it fits with the results gained at DMI, while the 
reaction of the rest of 75, or 98 testees can be inter-
preted by Scenarios 2 and 3 of the set.
240 testees in



















75 testees in function





Figure 2 - Results of the investigation of the occurrence
and prevention of emergency
The seamen involved in the above mentioned in-
vestigation had not previously had any major experi-
ence with organised team work, but their experiences 
were based on the traditional hierarchical form of 
ship organisation. The results gained by the inves-
tigation on the basis of the model described above 
point to the possibility of the occurrence of emer-
gency in the narrower sense – “b1” of 31.25% (Near 
Miss circumstances). The occurrence of accident and 
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emergency in the broader sense – “c1” is possible 
in 27.9% which means that the emergency of the 
levels “b1” and “c1” with regard to the scenario set 
occurred with 59.2% of the testees. Such a high per-
centage of the emergencies occurred confirms the 
unreadiness of ship’s organisation to collaborate in 
coordinated solving of the actual problems occurring 
during ship exploitation.
The investigation carried out can be supported by 
the analysis of the actual maritime accidents [12] with 
highly emphasised vertical or hierarchical manage-
ment structure described in [13]. One of the conspicu-
ous examples is the grounding of the tanker Torrey 
Canyon in 1967 or more recently of the tanker Erica 
in 1999 wherein the masters by their decisions based 
on the profit interests of the company, and not on the 
safety aspects, supported by the lack of the crews’ 
initiative due to the conventional fear of repression, 
led their ships into danger and eventually into distress 
– Scenarios 6 and 7 of the set. The more recent ex-
amples refer to the Ro-Ro passenger ship Herald of 
Free Enterprise (1987) which experienced an accident 
due to bad work organisation and inappropriate safety 
measures resulting from omissions and neglect by the 
company management as well as from the lack of ini-
tiative by the managing personnel on board to correct 
the obvious organisational and technical drawbacks 
– Scenarios 6 and 7 of the set. The next among the 
more recent examples is the Ro-Ro passenger ship Es-
tonia (1994) onboard which the second officer acted 
untimely and inefficiently delegating an incompetent 
person (helmsman) to check the bow ramp for correct-
ness in already heavy seas instead of asking for the 
master’s assistance – Scenario 7 of the set. Herewith 
fall the latest accidents which continuously confirm 
the unreadiness of hierarchical ship’s organisation to 
act promptly and effectively, i.e. to prevent emergency. 
One of the examples is the collision of the bulk carrier 
Alam Pintar with the fishing vessel Etoile des Mondes 
(2009). The basic reason reported is the unreadiness 
of the officers of the watch to call the master in time 
in the complex conditions in which they were caught 
– Scenario 7 of the set. A similar example has been 
reported in the collision of the tankers Saetta and 
Conger (2010) where there was obvious unreadiness 
for acting in emergency in the narrower sense (lack of 
cooperation among officers and engineers) as well as 
lack of communication – Scenario 6 of the set.
The investigation has shown that the circumstanc-
es for the occurrence of emergency arise from ineffec-
tive (hierarchical) ship organisation and inappropriate 
communication which disables undertaking of any col-
laborative or coordinated action [14]. Consequently, 
the basic prerequisite for an effective management of 
ship’s crew aiming at avoiding emergency is the intro-
duction of participative management of ship organisa-
tion or professionally set team work. Such an organi-
sation of work and management on board implies the 
Scenarios 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the set which can keep the 
possible occurrence of emergency at the level “a” to 
“b1” at worst. In case of the occurrence of emergency 
an efficient way of a fast return to ordinary conditions 
is possible through Scenarios 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the set 
and is represented by the model described in the next 
section.
5. MODEL OF MANAGEMENT IN 
EMERGENCY IN CONDITIONS OF 
PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT
The occurrence of emergency requires an urgent 
response to the altered conditions through mutual and 
synchronised acting of the crewmembers. The stress-
ful conditions emerging in the first phase of the occur-
rence of emergency can lead to a spontaneous block-
ing of rational thinking and resigning to fear. In this 
phase the symptoms of stress are recognised. The de-
velopment of the circumstances and the level of stress 
reached are reflected in the actions and work capabil-
ity in two ways: increase in the energy level of the body 
/ increase in the work capability and fall of the energy 
level of the body / reduced work capability (Figure 3).
It is precisely the application of short-term strategy 
explained in Scenario 2 which allows the implementa-
tion of Scenario 1 of the set. This makes it possible 
to control the level of stress and essential balance 
between decision-making and acting. By such an ap-
proach negative expressions of stress can be sup-






















Increasing levels of stress
from low to medium
work capacity increases
Medium
Increasing levels of stress
from medium to high
work capacity decreases
Figure 3 - Level of stress in relation to work capability
Source: [15]
Short-term strategy can be effectively carried out 
only in a well-trained team since it is based on open 
communication, well-developed initiative and ac-
ceptance of master’s authority. The application of 
short-term strategy is based on merging of individual 
knowledge and experience into the common, aiming 
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at acting effectively and reducing the risk of the action 
planned in emergency (Figure 4).
In order to unify effectively potential knowledge 
and experience during short-term strategy it is neces-
sary to previously develop cooperation as an effective 
work style which should replace competition and indi-
vidual efforts in reaching the goal.
5.1 Gathering information
Gathering information after the occurrence of 
emergency implies previously trained activities of re-
acting in emergency and preparing the emergency 
squad [16]. It is of particular importance during in-
formation gathering to use effectively the time at dis-
posal as well as potential knowledge and skills of all 
those who can take part in coping with the unexpected 
circumstances considering the nature of emergency.
Creative use of the time at disposal will reduce the 
risk for the emergency squad to fall under the influ-
ence of stress which in the initial phase of disorienta-
tion and uncertainty can lead to lack of information 
exchange among the members of the team, too much 
trust that the master will solve the problem as well as 
to a wrong reaction fuelled by fear.
The master’s support to the team work through 
the participative management style in the phase of 
gathering information (Scenarios 1 and 4 of the set) is 
extremely important for the feeling of leadership and 
taking responsibility which make the other members 
feel safe and create the climate for overcoming fear. 
Pieces of information on the conditions must be de-
scribed and, without pretensions to the future devel-
opment of the events, definite and not general, timely 
and objective.
On the basis of the information gathered the nature 
of the problem and its actual state are determined. 
This is also the first phase of short-term strategy which 
enables a creative approach to solving of new condi-
tions.
5.2 Assessment and the aim of planning
Assessment and the aim of planning represent 
the second phase of short-term strategy during which 
a plan of problem solving is developed. The second 
phase by its nature represents a logistic management 
process, or in other words it ensures a later develop-
ment of logistic processes according to assessment 
and the aim planned. In this part of short-term strat-
egy a creative use of the team members’ potential is 
very important (Scenario 2 of the set). The success 
in achieving the aim planned is in direct relation with 
the team members’ reaction to the actual problem 
identified and potential chances of its solution. In that 
sense, in dependence of the degree of team develop-
ment three kinds of reactions of the team members 
can be expected: a positive reaction, a passive reac-
tion or a negative reaction.
The positive reaction is characteristic of well-tuned 
and mature teams. The passive reaction is possible in 
the circumstances in which new, previously unknown 
members have joined the team so that the social as-
pects of mutual acceptance are still not pronounced, 
and the lately joined members refer with caution to 
the others [17]. The negative reaction of individuals 
depends on the level of stress that they can take. The 
persons who have reached a high level of stress show 
symptoms of emotional resistance to events – “storm-
ing” and reduced work capability. Due to a loss of self-
control such persons must be left out of team work in 
order not to lose control of the situation and the direc-
tion in which the team works.
During team work it is particularly important that 
the members think of themselves as the most impor-
tant part of the team not losing sight of the fact that 
the success depends on their interaction with other 
team members. Moreover, they have to recognise the 
interdependence of all team members. This means 
that each team member must realise that for success-
ful assessment and planning mutual trust is essential. 
This is supported by Zand’s model of trust (Figure 5).
Zand’s model of trust explains how trust increas-
es in teams acting in conditions of dynamic changes 
(Scenarios 4 and 5 of the set). The model shows the 
interaction of trust with regard to three variables: infor-
mation, influence and control. Vulnerability as an es-
sential element of trust is expressed through accepting 
responsibility even for other persons’ mistakes, mu-
tual exchange of essential information, encouraging 
individuals in their personal importance, contribution 
and self-control. In reply to such trust expressed the 
team members effectively share useful information re-
ferring to evaluation and planning. This consolidates 
the efforts of crewmembers that have united in the ac-
ceptance of responsibility so as to reach the goal set 
and in this way have realised the cooperative relations. 
These factors applied and combined with self-control, 
and not with formal control, strengthen the circle of 











1 officerst 3 officerrd 1 + 3 officersst rd
Figure 4 - Merging of knowledge and experience
Source: [8]
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ter tries to be invulnerable, does not share essential 
information, limits the influences and replaces self-
control by formal control.
In accordance with the model proposed with as-
sessment and planning the goal, each of the members 
present expose their plan in interaction with the others. 
This strengthens the synergic relations within the team 
when personal motivation and the entire knowledge 
with which the team disposes are manifested. The re-
sult of the motivation and joined knowledge result in 
the agreement achieved and the plan for future action. 
It is the interactivity achieved through joining knowl-
edge and experience that enables maintaining stress 
within the limits of medium level since mutual concen-
tration on circumstances and possible solutions reduc-
es emotional resistance to events. The unity realised 
helps control the stress and increases the level of body 
energy which is reflected in the increase of work capa-
bility. Such a team ready for work during this phase can 
set priorities in the process of problem solving.
The basic priority of the team prepared is the as-
sessment of hazards which can appear during the 
implementation of the plan accepted. Successfully 
integrated knowledge and experience of the team 
members become the condition the area of risk in the 
operation planned is to be reduced. Thus integrated 
knowledge can be applied by the Hazard and Opera-
bility Method – HAZOP1. The method contains general 
rules and directs its prerequisites to an organised team 
approach to the analysis of possible hazards and risks. 
Consequently, applied to the assessment of hazard 
to the operation planned it enables involvement of all 
team members (master, chief engineer, as well as deck 
and engineer officers). The team members headed by 
the master must carry out a study of the emergency op-
eration planned and check the following prerequisites 
of safe operation: 1. Assess if the operation planned 
will initiate further hazards that will affect the solution 
of the problem; 2. If such circumstances are recog-
nised, determine the degree of risk which results from 
the hazards recognised; 3. In accordance with the risk 
recognised assess the possibility of carrying out the op-
eration planned; 4. In case it is impossible to carry out 
the operation due to unacceptable or high risk, foresee 
deviations from the plan and lower risk alternative solu-
tions; 5. Define those phases of the operation in which 
it will not be possible to make instantaneous decisions 
and, accordingly, foresee information which can be 
necessary in such circumstances as well as appropri-
ate actions; 6. Ensure that the operation is carried out 
according to the above mentioned regulations.
The prerequisites of safe acting within the limits of 
the action planned and alternative solutions can be 
shown by the algorithm in Figure 6:
Algorithmic presentation of HAZOP method points 
to two possibilities:
1. Acceptance of the plan and the schedule of its 
implementation with regard to acceptable risk and 
hazards;
2. Deviation from the original plan and acceptance of 
an alternative plan and the schedule of implemen-
tation so as to reduce risk and hazards.
Trust
Increases vulnerability among
team members in the behaviour
which is not controlled.
Control
-accepts dependence on others,
-minor demands in the control of
others, -confidence in initiative
and performance of others.
Influence
Acceptance of assessment and
ideas of others in planning,
method,
setting goals and evaluation of
development of circumstances.
Information
Accurate, essential and complete
information on the problem
through mutual thinking and






1 – Supportive level of trust enhances the flow of information, influence and control.
2 – Acceptance of the influence of individuals in feedback influences the level of trust.
3 – Relationships reach stability.
Figure 5 - Zand's model of trust
Source: [18]
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Special information and procedures in the imple-
mentation of the alternative plan result from phase 5 
of HAZOP method. Risk evaluation putting the alterna-
tive plan into function has four basic grades, i.e.: high, 
conditionally acceptable risk; medium, conditionally 
acceptable risk; low acceptable risk; existing but mi-
nor risk.
High, conditionally acceptable risk implies circum-
stances in which the application of the basic plan 
would mean direct hazard to human lives and/or en-
vironment, ship and cargo. In that sense the alterna-
tive plan must contain measures and procedures of 
reducing the existing risk through possibilities of ad-
ditional activation of human and technical resources 
either external or internal (shipboard) [19]. Therefore, 
the application of the alternative plan should result in 
the reduction of the existing risk to an acceptable level 
in relation to the circumstances and achieve the aim, 
i.e. the effect wanted, and return to ordinary state.
Medium, conditionally acceptable risk of the ba-
sic plan is not a direct threat to human lives and/or 
environment but refers to the possibility of significant 
extension of damage to the ship and/or cargo. In that 
sense, the application of the alternative plan means 
that possible measures should be undertaken to pre-
vent the existing risk from extending damage within 
given circumstances with a simultaneous realisation 
of the effect wanted.
Low acceptable risk which can be contained in the 
basic plan is also not a threat to human lives and/or 
environment, but can indirectly lead to a limited exten-
sion of damage to the ship and/or cargo. If the basic 
plan, as opposed to the alternative plan, enables a 
faster and more efficient solution of the new condi-
tions which in dependence of the circumstances can 
worsen and turn into emergency in the broader sense, 
the basic plan can get the approval for implementa-
tion.
Existing but minor risk has no significance with re-
gard to human lives and/or environment, while regard-
ing the ship and/or cargo minor damages are possible. 
If the basic plan enables efficient and fast solution, in 
urgent circumstances it can be applied without reduc-
ing risk, i.e. the application of the alternative plan.
In dependence of the maturity of the team and 
meeting of the above mentioned prerequisites it is 
possible in emergency to get the effect of brainstorm-
ing2. Precisely the Zand’s model of trust which must 
be previously implemented in everyday practice pro-
vides conditions for achieving the above mentioned 
effect in this phase of short-term strategy, and, con-
sequently, the possibility of optimum application of 
HAZOP method.
Summarising the acting of the team during assess-
ment and the aim of planning it may be concluded that 
by realising the integration of knowledge of the master, 
chief engineer and officers the risk area of the action 
planned will be greatly reduced by optimum assess-
ment of hazard and the degree of risk.
5.3 Decision making
Decision making is based on previously made as-
sessment and goals set. The decision on application 
of the basic or alternative plan means checking of the 
plans by all team members with regard to the existing 
circumstances (Scenarios 1 and 2 of the set). Algo-
rithm of decision making in relation to circumstances 
is presented in Figure 7. Previously trained and in regu-
lar circumstances adopted method of “challenge and 
response” is the basis of checking of the plans men-
tioned as well as possible corrections with regard to 
the circumstances in which the ship is. This is also the 
phase for additional possible suggestions and spotting 
of possible omissions on the basis of HAZOP results, 
i.e. danger and usability of the action planned.
In the phase of evaluation of individual proposals 
the master has to be guided by a simple system of 
feedback relation in order to achieve the wanted qual-
ity of his final decision. For that purpose he can use 
anticipative management3 or preventive control since 
in that way the team members accept the master’s fi-
nal decision most easily because they see it as help in 
their work, and not as a means of pressure. Such man-
agement style results from the “leader – participation” 
model [20]. The master shares the problem with sub-
ordinated crew members as a group. They mutually 






















Figure 6 - The algorithm of safe operation
Source: [2] according to HAZOP prerequisites
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consensus about the decision. In this sense it should 
also be mentioned that, according to research made, 
group decisions are usually more accurate than indi-
vidual ones. However, “they are seldom better than the 
achievement of the best individual” [20]. In this con-
text the master as the most experienced member and 
the leader of the team represents potentially the best 
individual with greatest ability to bear effect. This ef-
fect gains its full expression in urgent situations when 
for some reason the team cannot reach a fast and co-
ordinated solution.
Therefore, in case the prerequisites for team opti-
mum operation have not been satisfied, when making 
a decision the master will act according to the alterna-
tive “leader – participation” model (He will solve the 
problem by himself or make a decision using informa-
tion currently at his disposal).
In this phase of short-term strategy the previously 
achieved unity of general and specific knowledge, ex-
perience and abilities is emphasised again. On this 
basis a quick checking of plans and possible correc-
tion is attained. The unity of knowledge, experience 
and abilities results from the previous mutual work 
in which common attitudes, customs and rules of be-
haviour within the team are established. Through the 
unified ability and developed interactivity the team will 
quickly and effectively select the best plan with regard 
to the circumstances. The swiftness and effectiveness 
of acting in such circumstances is a factor which limits 
the effect of emergency. Each team member with his 
suggestions can contribute to the master’s objective 
decision (Scenarios 2 and 4 of the set). Cooperation 
and coordination in these circumstances are the ba-
sis for common and individual safety, and they help 
the master to objectively select the best plan and the 
least risk. This is also the terminal phase of stress de-
velopment since the final plan and agreement have 
been reached and the team progresses to action. 
In the beginning of operation the common efforts of 
team members responsible for carrying out the work 
planned are emphasised which helps coordination be 
realised to its full extent. In this phase the negative 
components of stress have been entirely overcome 
and it has a positive effect on the work results.
5.4 Issuing orders
Before issuing orders the plan must be checked for 
intelligibility by each participant and individual respon-
sibility must be determined in the process of carrying 
out the plan (coordination). In this connection, care 
should also be taken of the cultural backgrounds of 
crewmembers because of possible language barriers 
as well as different perception of the development of 
the action. Afterwards, it is necessary to briefly sum-
marise the mutual action (cooperation) and set the di-
rectives for coordination during carrying out the action. 
Cooperation and coordination regarding the intelligibil-
ity of the plan and future mutual action are realised 
by the communication method of briefing. The master 
presides over a short meeting according to the com-
munication model of the wheel [20] (Figure 8).
Although the communication model of briefing 
shows a certain hierarchy of the flow of information, 
it is necessary due to the rate of exchange of infor-
















Master's decisions aiming at reaching the preferred results in relation to the circumstances
Checking and possible corrections of plans by all team members in relation to the circumstances







Figure 8 - Communic ation model of the wheel
Source: [2] – according to [20]
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the development of operation approved by him. It is 
in such circumstances that the master plays his es-
sential role of the leader who in the instant of making 
a command decision acts, but also takes overall re-
sponsibility for the operation which includes elements 
of mutual planning by all team members. In this sense 
the element of trust realised by the master with regard 
to the rest of the team members is emphasized as he 
takes the responsibility for the common plan. In this 
way he accepts the dependence on the others, shows 
trust in their initiative and their assessment of the de-
velopment of circumstances. The essence of the team 
is most pronounced since the orders are based on pre-
vious plans and information in which mutual thinking 
and planning are incorporated. In this context the mas-
ter shows vulnerability which results from trust in infor-
mation and influence of the rest of the team members. 
This strengthens the benevolence and dedication to 
carrying out the tasks assigned by all individuals.
Regarding communication the master becomes 
the central conductor of all communications within 
the group which makes it possible for him to exchange 
information quickly aiming at making such decisions 
and orders which result from possible new circum-
stances while carrying out the operation.
The orders which follow must be short, clear and 
effective. In order for them to be accepted as such, 
besides the master’s management style in immediate 
operation, the personal components of his authority 
are also essential. Personal components imply applied 
and previously accepted authority which is not formal 
and is based on the master’s personal qualities such 
as: experience, knowledge and ability to manage a 
team. These components are recognised by the team 
members as stable features of the leader. This acts as 
a cohesive force on the team in emergencies.
5.5 Checking the implementation
Checking the implementation means controlling 
the operation, giving support and coordinating ac-
tivities, in which the adopted principles of internal 
communication based on the method of checking 
and answers [21] get their full expression. Besides 
the method of challenge and response, the informa-
tion exchange must also be based on the closed loop 
method. This method, namely, enables fast and accu-
rate exchange of information while the method of chal-
lenge and response affects objectivity as well as the 
accurate analysis of the conditions and procedures im-
plemented. The communication flow during checking 
of implementation is significantly intensified among 
operation participants adopting the communication 
model of all channels (Figure 9).
Communication model of all channels implies the 
recognised communication method of challenge and 
response as well as the closed loop method. This 
type of communication model is highly characteristic 
of team communication due to equal presence of all 
team participants. In this way the basic motive of maxi-
mum dedication and contribution of the individual is 
realised. Such a motive results from significance of 
and consideration for individual opinions and views.
During this phase the master must be ready not 
only for active coordination within the plan applied but 
also for possible corrections and alternative solutions, 
Figure 10. According to Scenario 5 of HAZOP method 
in certain phases of the operation, circumstances can 
emerge in which it is not possible to make instanta-
neous (ad hoc) decisions. These circumstances re-
quire a fast and general flow of information through 
“all channels” on the basis of which it is possible to 
make a decision on correcting current procedures. 
The possibility of corrective action and alternative so-
lutions during carrying out of the plan is realised ac-






Figure 9 - Communication model of all channels














Figure 10 - Algorithm of corrective actions
during implementation
Source: [2] – according to [5]
Possible corrective actions and alternative solu-
tions are approved by the master who is entirely re-
sponsible for their implementation. Dedication and 
unity of the participants in the operation must be sup-
ported by the master in order to increase efficiency 
and ensure feedback information. When checking 
the implementation the master acts as participative 
leader and applies the style of management which 
provides support. Taking into consideration that the 
tasks have been structured in the previous phases of 
short-term strategy, with the application of supportive 
management style it is reasonable to expect effective 
implementation of the operation plan accepted.
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5.6 Decision support system
An emergency management system is a high-level 
decision support system that shall give the operator 
(typically someone in charge of the coordination of the 
emergency handling) information/ instructions/sug-
gestions about how to best handle the situation. The 
satisfactory operation of Decision Support Systems 
(DSS) for emergency management requires the man-
agement of complex information (recourses, spatial 
information, ship system status, etc). The system will 
typically give an overview of:
1. Status of the situation in terms of severity, position 
and spatial extent.
2. Status of physical units or persons that can be 
used in the management of the situation.
3. Decision support in terms of checklists, advice, 
prognosis, etc.
4. Other information (e.g. trends or history) that can 
be helpful [22].
Decision Support System (DSS) capable of sup-
porting most needs of emergency management is usu-
ally divided into five subsystems [4].
1. Communication Subsystems (CS) are supported 
DSS by advanced data acquisition, positioning and 
communications technologies to better understand 
the current state of operations,
2. Optimization Subsystem (OS) optimizes the most 
controllable processes in emergency situation 
(Network Optimization, Evacuation Routing, Re-
source Allocation, etc),
3. Spatial - Geo-information Subsystem (GIS) for Crisis 
Management,
4. Simulation Subsystem (SS) simulates parti-
al problem of the real-world environment for 
the supervised area (pollution propagation, dy-
namic of own and other ships, dynamic of fire, 
etc.),
5. Knowledge Subsystem (KS) gives the correspond-
ing reasoning methods required to perform the 
monitoring and management of emergency situa-
tions.
The Knowledge Subsystem provides the appro-
priate knowledge reasoning required for the plan-
ning and actions in emergency management. It 
consists of several parts, but the most important 
include:
 – Model-Base Management System – MBMS. Its 
main function is to build relationships between 
the models used and the specific applications that 
are used in decision support system. MBMS trans-
forms data from the DBMS in the information that 
is useful in the decision making process. Since 
many real problems are unstructured, MBMS is 
also used in the construction of appropriate mod-
els.
 – Data-Base Management System - DBMS. It serves 
as a database system for decision support. It stores 
large amounts of data that are relevant to the class 
of problems for which the decision support system 































































Figure 11 - DSS structure
Source: [4]
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6. CONCLUSION
The algorithm gained (Figure 7) serves the purpose 
in relation to its four functional components and the 
master’s appropriate management style in emergen-
cies. The aim of such management is to timely prevent 
the development of the event which occurred and its 
harmful effect on people, ship, environment and car-
go. This makes the acting planned come true in the 
emergency in the narrower sense.
In case of the emergency in the broader sense 
the algorithm (Figure 6) enables effective and timely 
measures of abandoning ship, saving human lives and 
minimising the consequences of the accident. Such 
effectiveness of the algorithm is made possible by the 
application of the method of risk and hazard assess-
ment related to organisational prerequisites, as well 
as the above described measures and procedures in-
fluencing synergic use of human knowledge, skills and 
technical resources.
The course of a team’s operation is determined by 
functional components (Figure 1, 4-5) on the basis of 
which the team achieves consistency in its work not 
only regarding the prevention of emergency, but also 
regarding optimum acting once an emergency has 
happened. In that sense, the method of short-term 
strategy with specific knowledge applicable in team 
work enables optimum effectiveness even in the worst 
conditions of emergency. This entirely establishes the 
need for effective implementing and conducting of 
previous methods through the algorithm of decision 
making in relation to circumstances.
Beside the active effect and logistic prerequisites of 
effective acting, the algorithms (Figure 6, 7-10) dimin-
ish the possibility of potential technology submissive-
ness through implemented communication models 
(Figure 8 – 9) during the action. With its organisational 
prerequisites and the management style defined it 
prevents the occurrence of the negative influences 
of the company and leadership. The negative aspect 
of self-induced complacency also disappears due to 
actual exhibition of individual values both within the 
team, and in the ship-to-company relation.
The basic prerequisite of the model application on 
board is the predisposition of the shipping company 
to form the decentralised organisational structure on 
shore. The reason lies in the fact that the decentralised 
organisational structure of the company is compatible 
with the principles of participative management on 
board which enhances reciprocity of interests of the 
company and the ship and finally improve the ship’s 
safety.
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SAŽETAK 
 
MODEL UPRAVLJANJA BRODOM U 
IZVANREDNIM OKOLNOSTIMA
Članak istražuje uvjete i okolnosti nastanka izvanrednih 
okolnosti tijekom eksploatacije broda. Definira se pojam 
i različiti pojavni oblici izvanrednih okolnosti te se simuli-
raju njihovi uvjeti nastanka kao i moguće prevencije od nji-
hovog nastanka ili razvoja. Na osnovu dobivenih rezultata 
istraživanja na uzorku od 240 profesionalnih pomoraca 
definira se prikladan organizacijski algoritam participa-
tivnog upravljanja brodom kao okosnice za primjenu modela 
upravljanja u izvanrednim okolnostima. Na toj osnovi prim-
jenjena je metoda Procjene rizika i opasnosti. Također i al-
goritam Procesa donošenja odluka je razvijen iz navedenih 
istraživanja. Osim na organizacijskim pretpostavkama par-
ticipativnog upravljanja dobiveni model se temelji i na kom-
pleksnim međuljudskim odnosima te djelovanju u stresnim 
okolnostima kroz sve faze izvanrednih okolnosti. U radu je 
opisan i odgovarajući sustav za potporu odlučivanju kao 
pomoć donositeljima odluka tijekom izvanrednih okolnosti.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI
izvanredne okolnosti, algoritam, timski rad, participativno 
upravljanje, hijerarhijsko djelovanje, komunikacija
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